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Abstract 
In many countries that have experienced coups d’état, the coup executors, particularly senior 
ranking personnel of the state military, granted themselves some form of amnesty and/or 
impunity from prosecution. While this is effective in achieving short-term peace, sustainable 
peace remains elusive. This paper challenges the issues surrounding the question of amnesty 
within such settings, and considers the significance of this neglect. Additionally, most studies do 
not address the issue of amnesty and impunity for political crimes as the international focus 
tends to be mostly on gross violation of human rights. However, conflicts in most small island 
developing states (SIDS) do not reach the intensity to produce such gross violations of human 
rights though evidence shows that these conflicts can be equally costly to the country (Chauvet, 
et al, 2010, p. 976).  
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1. Maximalists, Minimalists and Moderates on Amnesty 
Literature on amnesty is extensive and covers many issues spanning the position of opponents, 
proponents and those in the middle. However, few scholars have written on amnesty for 
political crimes and its link with coups d’état.  
Amnesty has evolved gradually from the stately pardon for any crime to maintaining political 
peace after international wars to a modern response to internal conflicts (Joinet, 1985). In 
recent decades, amnesty provisions have entered the transitional justice discourse and provoked 
strong debates for and against it. In the 1970s, organizations and persons rallied for amnesties 
for political prisoners in different parts of the world but in the 1980s, the focus shifted from 
amnesty to protest against impunity when a number of Latin American dictators granted 
themselves ‘self-amnesty’ while they were still in power (Joinet, 1997, pp. 3-4). While the 
condemnation for impunity was strong at this stage, it had not gained international momentum.  
The third shift was noted in the early 1990s when amnesties were increasingly negotiated as part 
of the peace agreements in countries moving towards democratization (Joinet, 1997, pp. 3-4). 
Since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the focus has shifted from 
blanket and unquestionable amnesties to ‘conditional-amnesty’ and is increasingly used with 
other transitional justice mechanisms (Sarkin, 2004; Mallinder, 2007a). The ascendancy of 
human rights as a fundamental principle directing state conduct increased international and 
national debates on amnesty and linked it to impunity during the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 
2005: 13; Orentlicher, 2004; Kritz, 2002, p. 33). Additionally, increasing use of information and 
communication technologies, has allowed people from all walks of life and different countries to 
participate in amnesty debates (Freeman, 2009, p. 1). Amnesty is a contentious issue and there 
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is no single cohesive view on amnesty as maximalists, minimalists and moderates within the 
transitional justice field justify their perspectives on amnesty.    
Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003, pp. 39-40) argue for amnesty on the basis that in countries 
coming out of conflict, former regime members who retain strong influence, could derail the 
peace process, if they feel threatened by possible legal action. Similarly, Randelzhofer & 
Tomuschat, (1999) advocate amnesty negotiated in peace agreements, to accommodate 
members of outgoing regimes, as they are unlikely to give up their potential to destabilize the 
peace process unless the threat towards them is lessened. Amnesty is granted to maintain 
national unity (Rigby, 2001); to acquiesce to the demands of members of a former regime who 
could otherwise destabilize the peace process (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003); as an incentive to 
acquire information about committed atrocities (Tutu, 1999, p. 25) and to negotiate ceasefire, 
disarmament, etc. (Mallinder, 2007a). 
While Cook (1997) argues against amnesty by emphasizing that it needs to take into account the 
demands of people in their country as well as adhere to international and national human rights 
standards, Mendez (1997, p. 7) states that blanket amnesties even if conducted after democratic 
debate are still an abuse of ‘majoritarianism’ as they ignore the rights of the minority who are 
usually the victims in such scenarios. Orentlicher argues that impunity is most common in states 
that have a weak judiciary, prevalent corruption and an entrenched patronage system 
(Commission on Human Rights, 2004). Opponents focusing on blanket amnesty argue that it 
shows little compassion for victims (Tutu, 1999: 30-32); would portray a culture of impunity 
(Kritz, 2002, p. 33); would embolden perpetrators to commit further atrocities (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009), and may undermine the rule of law (Cook, 1997). International conventions such 
as the Geneva Conventions and others oppose amnesties for gross violations. Amnesty 
proponents argue that it maintains political stability, but opponents cite many examples where 
amnesty has not led to lasting peace, and they claim that it may instead embolden perpetrators, 
while ignoring victims’ calls for justice (Human Rights Watch, 2009). This is demonstrated in 
the case of Fiji, as after each coup by the military, the perpetrators and their supporters were 
granted sweeping amnesty. 
But in recent years, Mallinder (2007) and Freeman (2009) have questioned the two divergent 
perspectives and reignited amnesty debates. Amnesty discourse needs to go beyond impunity 
versus justice or peace versus justice, to consider justice and human dignity, which accounts for 
both “pro-prosecutions and pro-amnesties” (Freeman, 2009, p. 109). Rather than discarding 
amnesty altogether, conditional amnesty could be utilised to encourage offender engagement in 
national reconciliation and reconstruction (Mallinder, 2007a, p. 39).  
Amnesties for perpetrators of gross violations of human rights were acceptable prior to the rise 
of human rights standards, but would be unacceptable today. The evolving debate on amnesty is 
indicative of dynamic changes in the field of transitional justice; the strong stance of the human 
rights agenda; the push for greater accountability for gross human rights violations; and the 
acknowledgement of various strengths and weakness of using amnesty and how it could be fine-
tuned. Discussions and debates on amnesty for political crimes that do not reach the benchmark 
of gross violations is negligible, although amnesty and impunity for these crimes had, in many 
situations, led to increased repression, and renewed and escalated violence. For instance, Iliff 
(2009: 162) states that in Zimbabwe there were no prosecutions of ZANU (PF)-affiliated 
perpetrators of political crimes and there was concern that these powerful perpetrators would 
remain in power and may “instigate further violence in an effort to retain the protections and 
privileges of power”.  
Gross violations of human rights is common is many larger countries that have a history of 
coups, such as Thailand, Pakistan and many others. However, the focus of this research was the 
reoccurrence of coups in SIDS, where the level of violence does not commonly reach to the levels 
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of gross violations. It is apparent that the international community is still not giving much focus 
to the types and levels of conflicts that occur in SIDS, as the conflicts in these countries cannot 
be realistically comparable to conflicts in larger States.  
 
2. Methodology 
In total, 59 persons were interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires and 16 key 
informants were interviewed using the in-depth approach. While the number of respondents 
may seem low, the rationale for this research is not to have generalised findings but rather to get 
rich data with many issues identified and discussed in depth.  
 
3.Terminologies Defined Amnesty 
 
The definition of amnesty differs substantially between jurisdictions due to various catalysts to 
its introduction which ultimately shapes the character it takes (Mallinder, 2007a, p. 5). 
However, it is broadly defined as an act of forgiveness by the state to perpetrators. For the 
purpose of this paper, we will use Freeman’s definition:  
 
Amnesty is an extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to remove the prospect 
and consequences of criminal liability for designated individuals or classes of persons in respect 
of designated offenses irrespective of whether the person concerned have been tried for such 
offenses in a court of law.  (Freeman, 2009, p. 13)  
3.1 Political crimes 
There is no commonly accepted definition of political crimes as they are often deemed to be 
context specific. However, they are broadly understood to be crimes against the established 
political order. The term is wide ranging: from purely passive offences such as political 
dissidence to more violent actions against the prevailing social order that does not affect private 
rights (Van de Wyngaert, 1980, p. 106). Political crimes generally include acts such as “treason, 
sedition, rebellion, using false documents, anti-government propaganda, possessing illegal 
weapons, espionage, membership of banned political or religious organizations, desertion, and 
defamation” (Mallinder, 2007b, p. 22; Van de Wyngaert, 1980, p. 107) Political crimes include 
activities such as attempted coups d’état as this is deemed anti-government.  
 
Common crimes can sometimes be regarded as political crimes as “under certain circumstances, 
namely when they are committed with a political purpose or when they have political 
consequences” (Van de Wyngaert, 1980, p. 95). Extradition law has been utilised to differentiate 
between common and political crimes by using three categories of tests: the political incidence 
test, the predominant motive test, and the political objective test (Van de Wyngaert, 1980, pp. 
108-111). The political incidence test attempts to establish if there was political disturbance and 
that the act was part of a continued political struggle (Van de Wyngaert, 1980, p. 111). The 
predominant motive test occurs if the act is associated with a political objective, that the political 
character of the act is greater in proportion than the common crime element, and finally, “… that 
the means used must be either the only recourse available or proportionate to the desired 
political outcome” (Van de Wyngaert, 1980; Yakoob, 2000, p. 545).  The political objective test 
“examines the specific nature of the act, without regard to the subjective motivation of the 
individual or whether the desired ends were political” (Van de Wyngaert, 1980, p. 542).  
 
In conflict and amnesty discourse, to date, political crimes were most clearly defined by South 
Africa prior to the establishment of its Truth and Commission and that definition will be used by 
this paper as the standard. Accordingly, political crime was defined within South Africa context 
as follows:  
 
Certain offences are recognized as "purely" political, eg. treason directed solely against the State 
and not involving a common or "ordinary" crime such as murder or assault or the dissemination 
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of subversive literature. In certain circumstances, a "common" crime, even a serious one such as 
murder, may be regarded as a political offence. Here the following are the principal factors 
which are commonly taken into account by national courts: 
i) The motive of the offender - i.e. was it a political motive (eg. to change the established 
order) or a personal motive (eg. to settle a private grudge).  
ii) The context in which the offence was committed, especially whether the offence was 
committed in the course of or as part of a political uprising or disturbance. 
iii) The nature of the political objective (eg. whether to force a change in policy or to 
overthrow the Government). 
iv) The legal and factual nature of the offence, including its gravity (eg. rape could never be 
regarded as a political offence). 
v) The object of the offence (eg. Whether it was committed against Government property 
or personnel or directed primarily against private property or individuals). 
vi) The relationship between the offence and the political objective being pursued, (eg. The 
directness or proximity of the relationship, or the proportionality between the offence 
and the objective pursued). 
vii) The question whether the act was committed in the execution of an order or with the 
approval of the organisation, institution or body concerned.  
(The Groote Schuur Minute, 1991)  
 
For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on all political crimes, but more specifically on 
the overthrow of democratically elected government, the abrogation of the constitution, 
interference in elections, the undermining of the independence of the judiciary, restriction of 
personal liberty, and arbitrary detention of human rights defenders.   
4. Political Crimes: a Precursor to Gross Violations? 
While there is a higher occurrence of political crimes which are subsequently amnestied, 
international stakeholders continue to overlook this fact as the majority of international laws, 
peace building activities and projects are focused on international crimes. The issue of 
sovereignty is raised, particularly for political crimes, as it is argued that these should be 
addressed by the nation rather than international law. However, the neglect of political crimes 
within international law could be detrimental as political crimes, which have a higher 
occurrence in many internal conflicts, are considered a precursor to international crimes 
(Mallinder, 2007b).  
One of the hypotheses of this paper is that, the international community and international law 
would be more effective in preventing conflicts from escalating by encouraging and/or 
pressuring for accountability, even for political crimes in countries where conflict is more 
structural than violent. Structural conflicts are invisible and implicit forms of violence that is 
manifested the inequalities in the social, political and economic structures of the society 
(Galtung, 1969, pp. 167–191). Most civil wars do not erupt suddenly out of isolated incidents: 
there is usually a build-up of tension and sporadic and low level of violence over a period of 
time.  
State repression is a major risk factor because it can transform latent grievances into active 
antagonisms, especially when repression is indiscriminate, since quiescence offers little 
protection. Importantly, there is strong evidence that government repression is habit-forming 
and that past levels of repression have a powerful effect on current behaviour.  (Thoms & Ron, 
2007, p. 695) 
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This has been noted in Fiji, as after the 1987 coup, military was successful in repressing the 
community through intimidation and terror, and they used similar forms of repression but more 
intensively in the later coups. During this period, a series of control mechanisms has contributed 
to increased militarisation in Fiji during coups and a lack of cohesive protest by the population 
as the military presence increased. Since 2007, increasing numbers of decrees have limited the 
right to assembly and protest; instigated the arbitrary arrest of dissents and impunity for 
arresting officers; prevented blacklisted individuals (usually those who had protested against 
governments repressive actions) from leaving/entering the country; increased surveillance on 
human rights defenders and expulsion of expatriates who speak against the coup. Reports 
submitted to Fiji’s Universal Periodic Reviews 2010 and 2014 document numerous cases of 
abuse by the interim government (OHCHR, 2009, 2014). For instance,  
According to CCF (Citizen’s Constitutional Forum) since April 10th 2009, at least 23 journalists, 
lawyers, human rights activists and religious leaders have been subject to arbitrary detention 
under the PER [Public Emergency Regulation] 2009, for up to 72 hours, for exercising their 
right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. CCF indicated that it has been informed 
of other cases of arbitrary detention and police brutality from people who wish to remain 
anonymous, and fears that there may be many more such cases. Several people were also 
detained and subjected to cruel and degrading treatment in the months following the coup. Four 
people have died in custody from the brutal treatment of military, police or prison officers since 
December 2006.  (OHCHR, 2009, p. 5) 
Figure 1 demonstrates that repression in Fiji peaked during coups d’état years of 1987, 2000 and 
2007 (as the last coup occurred in late 2006). While it does not identify the intensity and 
pervasiveness of repressions, evidence from Fiji suggests that such controls are more 
widespread after the recent coup when compared to earlier ones.  
 
Figure 1: Political Terror Scale for Fiji, 1986 – 2008 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data downloaded from Political Terror Scale. [Online]. Available 
at:http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/download.php. [Accessed 30 July 2010] 
 
It is argued that addressing the root causes of conflict at the initial stages, combined with 
accountability, establishing the rule of law and development, among other factors, could 
minimize tensions flaring up into protracted conflicts (Lederach, 2006; Collier, et al, 2003). 
While is it recognized that the “internal conflicts and their consequences fall within the domestic 
jurisdiction and therefore national sovereignty” (Deng, et. al., 1996, p. 1), however “sovereignty 
can no longer be seen as a protection against interference, but as a charge of responsibility 
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where the state is accountable to both domestic and external constituencies” (Deng, et. al., 1996, 
p. 3). Human rights based approaches also assert that the state; which is the duty bearer of 
rights and is supposed to promote, protect and fulfill the rights of its citizens, and if it starts to 
oppress its citizens, it losses the legitimacy to argue for state sovereignty.  
In Sierra Leone, after independence in 1961, it took almost 30 years for the conflict to escalate 
from tensions to violent conflict (Collier, et al 2003, p. 127). In South Africa, the latent 
restrictions on Africans were turned into explicit apartheid legislation systematically over a 
period of 57 years and it is argued that early pressure from the international community could 
have been effective in ending this conflict much earlier (Kelly, 2002, p. 42). Since the 1960s, UN 
worked consistently to dismantle apartheid in South Africa through its many resolutions and 
later with sanctions. It was collaborative actions of the international community through the UN 
and African states within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that eventually led to the 
termination of its apartheid policy (Mangu, 2011). Pressure from the international community 
pushed the South African leadership during the apartheid era to dismantle and reform their 
policies and practices.  
The repeated failure to stem the ethnically-based political violence and hold perpetrators of 
human rights abuses to account created a climate of impunity in Kenya that led to cycles of 
violence. The atmosphere of distrust and division created by the longstanding lack of justice has 
been repeatedly manipulated by leaders in support of their own political agendas. While in 
Kenya the pressure stopped the violence, failure to sustain that pressure and to actually end 
impunity is likely to result in more violence sometime in the future.  (Human Rights Watch, 
2009, p. 81) [Emphasis added] 
Similar scenarios are noted in almost all states experiencing civil wars: political crimes that do 
not fall within the category of international crimes are perpetrated by conflicting parties without 
accountability as the rule of law is weakened over a period of time. International community’s 
pressure on SIDS who are infringing on human rights abuses and committing political crimes, 
could encourage these countries to reform their approaches during times of tension. For 
instance, after the 2000 coup, the Qarase government acknowledged that citizens of the country 
did not have much trust in the Fiji Police Force and agreed to collaborate with Australian 
government to have an Australian citizen head the Fiji Police Force and to open investigations 
on the death of numerous soldiers and rebels.    
Evidence from some countries indicates that amnesties for political crimes have emboldened 
perpetrators to commit even worse crimes than before. For instance, in Angola, from 1990 
onwards Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA group were granted at least six successive amnesties, but 
crimes continued and even worsened every time the conflict resumed (Human Rights Watch, 
2009, pp. 61-68). After three amnesties in Sierra Leone, serious abuse of civilians by both rebels 
and government forces continued (Human Rights Watch, 2009, pp. 57-66). Amnesty for 
perpetrators in conflicts in Burundi has been documented at least six times between 1967 and 
2006 (The Amnesty Law Database, 2015). During the Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
Forum, the Special Envoy to the Angolan peace process stated that UNITA should not have been 
granted further amnesties after the collapse of the Bicesse Accords. While some of the above 
amnesties were for international crimes, the majority of amnesties were for lesser political 
crimes, but little attention was given to this by human right activists, policy makers and the 
international community, including international organizations such as Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International. The heightened attention on amnesty for international crimes is 
understandable and, but the continued overlooking of amnesty for political crimes sets a 
dangerous precedent for countries with histories of structural conflicts.  
Countries like Fiji are already showing signs of escalating tensions and violence. Fiji has had 
four coups; two in 1987, in 2000 and recently in 2006 and after each coup, military personnel 
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have been granted amnesty. The 1987 coups were bloodless and apart from the release of a large 
number of prisoners to terrorize the coup protesters, there were few incidents of overt violence. 
This changed in the 2000 coup, which brought untold suffering to the country as widespread 
violence was committed against the Indo-Fijian community. The criminality arising out of this is 
seen as the legacy of impunity given to the 1987 coup makers. “The conferment of immunity 
from prosecution to Rabuka and his accomplices gave the 1987 coups its ultimate legitimacy”, as 
it served not as a deterrent, but an inspiration, for the would-be perpetrators of 2000 coup 
(Chang, 2008, p. 11). Although some consider this argument not convincing as the 2000 coup 
was a civilian coup, it is evident that it was planned and carried out with the help of a rebel unit 
within the military. While the 2006 coup was not violent, it is more oppressive as the country 
has been under curfew for many months and there was increasing censorship and torture of 
media personnel, human rights activists and anyone who spoke against the regime. To date, four 
civilians have died while undergoing interrogation in police/military custody (OHCHR, 2009, p. 
5). This pattern of escalating violence in Fiji indicates that after each coup, more violence is 
evident in comparison to previous coups. This pushes back the boundaries of tolerance.  
5. Amnesty and its Relationship with Coups d’états 
Figure 2 demonstrates the link between coups and amnesty. While it is generally assumed that 
amnesties were more readily granted in the 1960s, due to the lack of human rights awareness, 
data indicates the opposite, as only 15% of amnesties were granted for all violations related to 
coups in that era. This could be due to various factors: lack of information from those years; 
supremacy of the military within the countries concerned; with negligible threat of prosecution, 
perpetrators did not seek amnesty; lack of NGOs at national and international level to push for 
accountability; and lack of awareness among local populations to demand justice. This data 
suggests that the granting of amnesty has gained prominence alongside human rights advocacy. 
Figure 2 demonstrates this, as between 1990s and 2000s, the majority of coup makers were 
granted amnesty.  However, amnesty may have been more conditional, and may have required 
some form of disclosure, truth telling, ceasefire, disarmament, or vetting rather than the grant 
for a blanket amnesty which is more indicative of impunity. However, in some countries, blanket 
amnesty is still awarded. For instance, in Fiji, the amnesty for the 2000 coup was conditional, 
but for the 2006 coup unconditional amnesty was awarded.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Grant of Amnesty for Coup related offences, by Decade 
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Amnesty is only one factor that leads to or deters coups. As stated above, socio-economic and 
developmental factors such as enhanced livelihoods, access to services, improved infrastructure, 
improved literacy rates, strengthened NGOs, and so on could also lower tension within a country 
and hence avoid the risk of coups. This is observed in Ghana, Nigeria, South Korea, and Brazil 
and elsewhere. On the other hand, in Sierra Leone, Liberia and many other African countries, 
the amnestied coup makers of the past have formed their own rebel groups when dissatisfied 
with the peace process, their diminishing role in the new government or for other reasons. 
Conflicts in many such countries that had initially started with tension, coups and counter coups 
have now become entrenched. It could be assumed, from Figure 2, that increasing amnesties in 
recent years have led to a decline in coups d’état, but a realistic analysis of the different 
countries presents a different picture. Attempted coups remain a continued threat in a number 
of countries, such as the Philippines. It is argued that international and national push to 
denounce amnesty for removal of democratic governments has the potential of deterring 
potential future coup perpetrators.   
Country studies show that Fiji, Thailand, Pakistan, and Mauritania have implemented a ‘rolling’ 
amnesty meaning that after the execution of a coup, the coup makers are granted widespread 
amnesties. While the notion is to maintain the fragile peace and appease the military regime in 
power, it has been proved ineffective as a way of minimizing future coups as all these countries 
have recurring coups, nearly always led by the military. History indicates that appeasement of 
military regimes leads to more violations later as it indicates government weakness to the 
military (Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, 2005: 2). In Fiji, the precedent for impunity was set in 
1987 when Rabuka was awarded a blanket amnesty for staging the first coup, as this presumably 
emboldened others to execute coups and legitimize granting of amnesties (Lal, 2002).   
6. Minimalist approach to Amnesty in Fiji 
Researches show that in transitional countries, negotiations for or against amnesty could be a 
contentious issue, depending on the relative strengths of the perpetrators and society’s demand 
for justice (Skaar, 1999;Zalaquett, 1992; Malamud-Goti, 1990). The delicate balancing act 
between maximalist, minimalist and moderate approaches towards amnesty indicates that 
amnesty should be granted for the sake of national unity if the perpetrators have the strength to 
destabilise the peace process (Neier, 1990; Nino, 1996). In Fiji, the minimalistic approach to 
amnesty has been utilised for all military coup perpetrators. Ironically, the Bainimarama led 
military had taken offence at a civilian coup perpetrator, George Speight, negotiating for 
amnesty. It seems that the military personnel consider themselves to be above the law, when it 
comes to being held accountable for their actions.  
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Figure 3 demonstrates that a resounding 78% of the respondents consider amnesty for coup 
perpetrators as bad. A number of key informants also think that amnesty is bad as it sends the 
wrong signals to the coup perpetrators and to future generations.  
 
Figure 3: Amnesty for Coup Perpetrators 
 
 
 
Yes, undoubtedly amnesty has encouraged the coup behaviour because it does not give space 
for accountability and justice to take place and if you don’t deal with this, justice will never be 
done and there will always be resentments due to that and it also signals the message that it’s 
ok carry out a coup. They continue to elude prosecution and I think that is a wholly unhealthy 
cycle that needs to be addressed.  (Andrew Hughes – Former Commissioner of Fiji Police) 
Some of the key informants were sceptical that the military could be held accountable as they 
were presently so powerful. John Rabuku also mentions a valid concern of many developing 
countries, the use of limited resources for thorough investigations and long prosecutions, and 
suggested that reparations which could allow some accountability of the perpetrators and 
provide some tangible compensation to the victims.  
Chances of Bainimarama being prosecuted are very low, if they had prosecuted Rabuka and 
put him in jail, our history might have been different.  (Imrana Jalal – Human Rights Activist) 
The thing is, people who come into power like this are not stupid, so before they hand over 
power they make sure that they have acquired amnesty and are safe from prosecutions. I am 
kind of person who likes to deal with issues and have some closure to it therefore I won’t like to 
see our Courts being inundated with all these proceedings from the past, where many of our 
much needed resources would be diverted. But I would like to see a compensation fund set up 
and that there is some compensation hearing and that military could be occasionally liable 
and that compensation is paid to people affected.  (John Rabuku - Ex-Director of Public 
Prosecutions) 
Joseph Brown highlights a concern discussed earlier in this paper; if amnesty is given, what 
types of crimes it could cover,  
Recently they have created immunity decrees and the wording says that all political decisions 
made will be covered under this, but shouldn’t it be the courts to decide whether the decision 
made by police or military was a political motive or was it following directives from his 
superiors, when they arrest, torture or detain you?  (Joseph Brown - Secretary to the late Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara during his enure as Prime Minister, Vice President and later President) 
Figure 4 demonstrates that the majority of the respondents considered amnesty for military 
coup perpetrators to be unjust (61%), 12% were tolerant of such amnesty since the military led 
Good
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government had removed problematic structures in Fiji’s society. Also, similar to concerns 
shown in Table 1, 3% of the respondents feared that such amnesty could lead to more coups and 
instability.  
 
Figure 4: Opinion on Amnesty for military coup perpetrators 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Reasons why coup perpetrators should (not) be held accountable for their actions 
Reasons why the coup perpetrators should or should 
not be held accountable for their actions 
Total 
Yes, they should be held accountable because:  46 (78% of total) 
• To be a deterrent for others 12% 
• Coups are illegal 34% 
• Caused suffering to others/country 14% 
• Other 8% 
No, they should not be held accountable because:  22% 
• It may lead to other conflicts 5% 
• This coup is beneficial for the country 14% 
• Other 3% 
TOTAL 59 respondents 
 
 
 
7.Conclusion 
The issue of amnesty has been much discussed in Fiji since 1987 and while data shows that 
many people do not regard it in a positive light and consider it unjust, respondents have also 
acknowledged that the military is too strong at this stage to be held accountable. In Fiji, the 
military is well versed in portraying itself positively to the people and they sense some 
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acceptance amongst the public of their self-awarded amnesty because of the belief that the coup 
has been, in some ways, beneficial. To some extent, their views are justified as Bainimarama’s 
interim government was able to dismantle some structures and policies that were deeply 
divisive. However, there is also uneasiness with the growing strength of the military. This can for 
instance be seen from the 2013 Immunity Act, which is so tightly drafted in order to preserve the 
military’s power. In the 2013 Constitution of Fiji, immunity has been entrenched through Acts 
158 (1), (2) and (3), which states that  
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, this Chapter and any 
immunity granted or continued in this Chapter shall not be reviewed, amended, 
altered, repealed or revoke.  
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no court or tribunal shall 
have the jurisdiction to accept, hear or make any decision or order with 
respect to any challenge against the provisions of this Chapter and any 
immunity granted or continued in this Chapter. 
(3) No compensation shall be payable by the State to any person in respect of damage, 
injury or loss to his or her property or person caused by or consequent upon any conduct 
from which immunity has been granted under this Chapter.  (Government of Fiji, 2013: 
99,100). [emphasis added] 
 
All these clauses ensure that the military cannot be held accountable in any form even in future. 
This law may be contested at some point but it is unlikely that this would be done in a local court 
as Acts 158(2) and (3) sets limitations on this avenue of seeking justice.  
 
As stated above, transitioning countries need to be careful in striking a balance between 
demanding justice and accountability and granting amnesty when the perpetrators are still in 
power or continue to hold significant influence. In Fiji, Bainimarama and many people 
associated with him continue to be in power through the 2014 democratic elections. This fact 
and the significant militarisation of Fiji’s civil service indicate that military influence is 
entrenched and will continue to be part of the country’s political landscape for many years to 
come. In such a scenario, amnesty is unlikely to be contested by the victims. This is important as 
Fiji’s history is silent about the human rights violations that have occurred during times of 
coups, due to stringent media censorship. There have been some reports of human rights 
violations from international media and international NGOs, but these only cover a small 
number of such incidences. Bainimarama has carried out a number of significant structural and 
policy reforms in Fiji that were unthinkable in the past. However, he has been silent regarding 
military reforms. As he now holds power democratically, this would be an ideal time for him to 
encourage military reforms in Fiji as he has the mandate from the people and also strong 
support from the military; "Many senior military officers have come out openly saying they 
prefer Bainimarama to lead the country..." said Professor Brij Lal in an interview with ABC 
News (2014). However, it remains to be seen if Bainimarama is genuinely interested in 
developing Fiji towards stability and towards reforming the military that is subservient to the 
democratic government or whether it is simply empty rhetoric.  
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